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Article�
Must We Value Life to
Have a Right to It?
In her recent article "Death, Mis
fortune, and
Species Inequality,"l
Ruth Cigman gives clear, careful
expression to an argument which
seems well on its way to becomi ng a
classic among opponents of animal
rights. 2 Cigman's argument runs as
follows:
A right to X entails the
right to be protected against
certain
actions
which
will
result in the misfortune, or
possible misfortu ne, of not-X.
A condition for being the sub
ject of a right is therefore the
capacity to be the subject of
the corresponding misfortune.
(49) For a creature to be a
possible subject of the misfor
tune of death, life itself must
be an object of value for it,
and this possibility is presup
posedby the right to life;
otherwise the right to life
would be a right to be pro
tected from something which
could not conceivably be a mis
fortune, which does not make
sense. (59)
The
relationship· between
capacity and desire in this
context must be examined. My
suggestion is that, when we
fill in the concept of desiring
not to die in a way which is
relevant to the misfortune of
death and the right to life, we
shall have to withhold this
from animals. (49-50)
For convenient reference we may
reduce this argument to the following
compact form:
Pl: Only beings capable of valuing
life itself can suffer the misfortune of
death.
P2:
On Iy
bei ngs
capable
of

suffering the misfortune of death can
have a right to life.
P3: Animals are incapable of valu
i ng Iife itself.
C: Therefore, animals cannot have
a right to life.
Each of the premises of this argument
is dubious.
Even P2, which seems
the safest of the lot, would be chal
lenged by some rights theorists, such
as H. L. A. Hart, who hold that
rights are not essentially devices for
protecting interests but for securing
choices. 3 However, we will not pur
sue this
line
of criticism
here.
Whether a careful analysis of rights
would reveal that the right to life
protects our interest in life, secures
our choice to remain alive, or some
thing else, this right seems clearly
tied to death being a misfortune.
P3 would certainly be attacked by
many advocates of animal rights who
emphasize tIthe evolutionary continuity
. of mental experience"4 and would claim
that many animals have sufficiently
extensive temporal
awareness,
self
consciousness, and other requisite
aspects of rationality to value life
itself. However, I wi II leave the com
parison of animal with human psychol
ogy, rationality, and values to those
who have carefully studied the matter,
e.g., the ethologists.
The truth or
falsity of P3 is at least as much a fac
tual as a conceptual issue and is,
therefore, not resolvable by philoso
phers.
Cigman emphasizes the com
plexity of experience in which the
human awareness and evaluation of
death occurs, and it seems reasonable
. to agree with her presumption that
many of the animals animal rightists
seek to protect, e. g., rabbits and
chickens,
lack that complexity of
experience. So, let us pass by objec
tions to P3.
The line of questioning I wish to
pursue here concerns Pl: must one
value life itself in order to suffer
death as a misfortune? I question Pl
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because in so many other cases it is
not the case that one has to value X
itself in order to have a right to X.
Consequently, agreeing that if one
has a right to X then not-X must be a
misfortune. for him, it follows that
not-X can be a misfortune for an
individual even though he does not
value X itself. S
Cigman's argument is a specific
case of the following argument form:
Pl': Only beings capable of valu
ing X itself can suffel' the misfot,tune
of not-X.
P2':
Only beings capable of suf
fering not-X as a misfortune can have
a right to X.
P3':
B is incapable of valuing X
itself.
C':
Therefore, B cannot have a
right to X.
Reflection on our current practice of
according rights will show that there
is something wrong with arguments of
this form.
Further reflection will
show how Pl' (and
P3') can
be
revised to yield an acceptable argu
ment form.
However, that form will
not exclude the possibility of animal
rights.
Before proceeding with this analy
sis, we must clarify what "valuing X
itself" refers to. It would be obvious
that we can have a right to X even
though we do not value X itself, if
"valuing X
itself"
meant "X
has
intrinsic value for us rather than (or
in addition to) instrumental value."
Whatever "intrinsic value" may mean,
it is clear that we have rights to
things which are of merely instrumen
tal val ue for us, e. g., a speedy trial.
Cigman's insistence that misfortunes
be tied to desires (57), her use of
the ph rase "I ife itself as an object of
value" (59), her rejection of a utilita
rian alternative because "it does not
justify calling death a misfortune for
the animal who dies" (54), and her
rejection of Thomas Nagel's analysis of
the misfortune of death because it
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does not require that "life is some
thing most of us value and want to
experience for as long as possible"
(56) give the impression that some
sort of shadowy intrinsic value in life
vs. merely instrumental value for life
distinction is at work in her argu
ment. Be that as it may, this distinc
tion is incidental to the argument and
should not mislead on into dismissing
the argument out of hand. The dis
tinction on which this argument turns
is that between having an interest in
X and taking an interest in X, and
"valuing life itself" should be inter
preted as "taking an interest in life."
One can "have an interest" in
something which affects one's well-be
ing but of which one is ignorant or
unconcerned.
Vitamins,
pesticides,
and heavy metals in drinking water
will all affect one's well-being even
though one has never heard of them
or even though one is unconcerned
about them because one does not
believe they will affect one's well-be
ing .
However, "taking an interest"
requires that one be aware of the item
in question, believe that it affects
one's well-being, and, consequently,
consciously give a value (positive or
negative) to the item.
Cigman does
not employ the language of interests,
but the following passages make clear
that she is relying on this distinction:
Death is not a misfortune
merely because it is a bad
condition to be in, relative to
being alive, healthy, and so
on; rather it is a misfortu ne
because life is something most
of us value and wan~ to exe_~
rience for as long as possible.
(56, emphasis added)
I reject the suggestion that
a categorical desire, or any
thing of this nature, is attri
butable to animals.
For con
sider what would have to be
the case if this were so.
First, animals would have to
possess essentially the same
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conceptions of life and death
as persons do. The subject of
a categorical desire must either
understand death as a condi
tion which closes a possible
future forever,
and
leaves
behind one a world in which
one has no part as an agent or
conscious being of any sort, or
he must grasp,
and then
reject,
this
conception
of
death, in favor of a bel ief in
immortality.
Either w~the
radical and exclusive nature of
the transition from life to
death must be understood--it
must at least be appreciated
why people think in these
terms--so that the full signifi
cance of the idea that "X is a
reason for -Iivin.s" may be
grasped.
(58-59,
emphasis
added)
It seems accurate to paraphrase
Cigman as claiming that although ani
mals may have an interest in life
(since it is a good condition to be in
relative to death), they cannot take
an interest in life (since they are
incapable of understanding the full
sign ificance of death).
This distinction between things
which affect our interests but in
which we do not take an interest is
certainly a real one. But is it rele
vant to the issue of what it makes
sense to sayan individual has a right
to?
Is it possible to have a right to
something which affects one's interests
but of which one is ignorant? Cer
tainly. People have rights to inheri
tances they do not know about. Even
patients who are unaware of "The
Patient's Bill of Rights" have a right
to see thei r medical records.
And
people who have never heard of "The
Universal Declaration of the Rights of
Man" and have grown up in cultu res
which not only deny them human
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rights but also have taught them to
believe they are subhuman are still
entitled to human rights. There is no
conceptual, moral, or legal difficulty
with ascribing a right to X to someone
who is unaware either of X or of the
possibility that he could have X or
the right to X. Having a right to X
does not require that we actually
know about, desi re, or value X itself.
It might be objected that it is not
actually valuing X itself that is
required for the right to X but the
capacity to value X itself which is
required.
Most fundamental
moral
principles involve the idea of capac
ity, e. g., the capacity to suffer in
utilitarianism and the capacity to rea
son
in
Kantianism.
Cigman
also
emphasizes the ~~E.~~J!Y to suffer a
misfortune.
So, perhaps the proper
question is: is it possible to have a
right to something which affects one's
interests but which one is incC!.pable of
understanding or valuing?
Again,
there are some fairly obvious cases of
this.
Severely retarded, brain-dam
aged, and senile people have legal
rights, property rights, civil rights,
and human rights which they are
incapable of understanding and valu
ing. They may value the medical care
and other benefits property, social
welfare programs, legal procedures,
and other things to which they have a
right secure for them, but they are
incapable of understanding or valuing
pr'operty, social welfare institutions,
legal procedures, human respect, and
moral obligation themselves.
Conse
quently, current moral and legal prac
tice show that an individual can have
a right to X even though he is inca
pable of understanding and valuing X.
This conclusion might be criticized
for ignoring the normality dimension
of the idea of "capacity".
Cigman
emphasizes what people !!.orm.!L\y value
in her discussion of the misfortune of
death and in circumventing the possi
ble counterexample of suicidal people.
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Similarly, Stanley Benn contends that
animal rights arguments referring to
inconsistency in extending righh to
subrational humans while denying them
to more rational animals are fallacious
because rights are extended primarily
not to individuals but to species based
on the capabilities of normal members
of the species. 6 So, the proper ques
tion may be: is it possible to have a
right to something which affects one's
interests
but
which
even
normal
beings of one's kind are incapable of
understanding or valuing? Of course,
it is impossible for us to refer to any
actual cases concerning human beings
where this happens.
Such examples
would require that we understand
things human beings are incapable of
understanding.
However, the follow
ing non-human example seems plausi
ble enough to show at least that a
positive answer to this question is not
nonsensical.
Cigman acknowledges, as do most
opponents of an animal right to life,
that an ima Is s hou Id be spa red un nec
essary suffering. Now, industrial pol
lution causes many animals avoidable
suffering, but animals are incapable of
understanding how industrial pollu
tants affect their habitats, undermine
thei r health, and cause them to suf
fer.
It follows that although animals
suffer from a polluted environment,
they are incapable of valuing a pollu
tant-free environment.
But does it
also follow, as Cigman would have to
claim, that it would be nonsensical to
say that animals whose well-being is
destroyed by industrial pollution are
suffering a misfortune in losing their
healthy habitats and have a right (call
it the "right to a healthful envi ron
tl
ment ) to be protected against indus
trial pollution? We encounter no con
ceptual difficulty in asserting that
people have a right to a healthful
environment.
Is the fact that people
normally can but animals
normally
cannot understand how industrial pol
lutants cause them to suffer morally
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significant enough to show that ani
mals cannot conceivably share in this
right?
Since many of the forms of
suffering caused by industrial pollu
tants, e. g., blindness, debilitation,
cancer, and birth defects, are shared
by human and non-human animals,
reference to the normal capacity for
understanding
which
differentiates
human from non-human animals would
seem not only to be insufficiently
weighty to justify such a claim but
also to be so totally beside the point
as to be a blatant rationalization of
anth ropocentric prej udice.
It might be objected that
(a) since animals take an interest
in suffering, suffering can be misfor
tune for them;
(b) consequently, animals can, at
least as far as Cigman's argument is
concerned, have a right not to suffer;
(c) the right to a healthful envi
ronment is just a part of this right
not to suffer, since a healthful envi
ronment is essential to avoid suffer
ing;
(d) therefore, the example of the
right to a healthful envi ronment does
not show that animals can have rights
to things they are incapable of valu
ing.
An obvious problem with such an
objection is that a healthful environ
ment is not really "a part of" not suf
fering.
However, setting aside such
technical problems, we may note that
using (a) and (b) in conjunction with
the following modification of (c) yields
the conclusion that animals can have a
right to life:
(c') the right to life is a part of
the right not to suffer, since life is
essential to avoid suffering.
One can avoid suffering by dying, of
course, but what is ordinarily valued
under the label of "avoiding suffer
ing" is not merely the absence of suf
fering but a life free of suffering. It
is such a life that requi res a healthful
environment, so any sort of "negative

6
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utilitarianism" rebuttal here is already
ruled out by (c). Consequently, the
pattern of analysis in (a) through (d)
cannot be used to support the claim
that animals cannot have a right to
life.
I find the inability to understand
what is causing one to suffer to be
morally insignificant where avoidable
suffering is involved, and the almost
universal rejection of cruelty to ani
mals, without requiring prior analysis
of their level of understanding, sug
gests that my judgment is not anoma
lous. Until more persuasive argument
is forthcoming, I conclude that beings
can have rights to things which nor
mal beings of thei r kinds are incapa
ble of understanding and valuing.
These three possibilities,
igno
rance, individual inability to under
stand, and normal inability to under
stand, seem to cover the field. So, I
conclude that taking an interest in or
valuing X itself is not a necessary
condition for having a right to X.
Since all the cases just discussed sat
isfy P3 ' , the problem with the above
argument form must lie in Pl' or P2'.
But Cigman's claim that rights entail
corresponding misfortunes (P2') was
conceded, so the failure of this argu
ment form must lie in Pl t, the claim
that suffering the misfortune of not-X
requires taking an interest in X. In
all the above examples, the individuals
who did not or could not take an
interest in X nonetheless had an
interest in X. This suggests that we
can correct the above argument form
by substituting the following for Pl
(and P3'):
Pl" Only beings which have an
interest in X can suffer the misfor
tune of not-X.
P3" B has no interest in X.

which are incapable of having rights
if anything is.
Such things cannot
have interests, since they have no
well-being of their own, any evalua
tion of their condition being derived
from other beings which have or take
an interest in them.
The case of
plants and insentient animals is a bit
more problematic.
Since they can
flou rish or wither, it makes sense to
say they have a well-being of their
own, an excellence or virtue of their
own nature, as Aristotle would say.
On the other hand, they cannot be
covered by standard moral principles,
such as the principle of utility, which
are concerned with happiness and not
merely with flou rishing. ·1 suggest
handling this problem in the following
way: since moral principles are fun
damentally concerned with happiness
or rationality, not with growth or
even health, we should interpret "B
has an interest in X" tg the !!1_C?I~
relevant sense to mean 'X has (or will
have or is likely to have) an effect on
B's feelings of well-being
(e.g.,
pleasure, feeling fit, enthusiasm, con
tentment) or his judgments about his
well-being. "
It follows that plants
and insentient animals do not have
interests in the morally relevant sense
and that all beings have morally rele
·vant interests only where their feel
ings or judgments of well-being are
involved. It fu rther follows, accord
ing to the revised argument form,
that no being can have rights in areas
where its· feelings or judgments of
well-being are not affected. 7 That
seems to be placing the distinction
where it belongs.

I

Pl" not on Iy accommodates the
above counterexamples to Pl'; it also
excludes
stones,
works
of
art,
machines, and other inanimate objects

Returning to the specific case of
the misfortune of death and the right
to life, the only way to save Cigman's
argument would seem to be somehow to
show that death and the right to· life
is a special case: although in all the
sorts of cases just discussed being a
possible subject of misfortune and
rights does not requi re the ability to
take an interest, in the case of the
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misfortune of death and the right to
life one must be able to value life
itself because . . . . . .
I do
not know how to fill in that blank,
which leaves me with the following
speculation and conclusion.
Speculation:
We commonly
call
death a .misfortune, so when Cigman
claims that the right to life presup
poses the possibility of suffering the
misfortune of death, that seems rea
sonable enough.
However, as she
progresses through her argument, she
ties "misfortune" to valuing, in the
sense of taking an interest, thereby
giving "misfortune" a technical mean
ing which does not quite fit with its
common use.
It would not be more
unusual to describe a pelican born
blind as "unfortunate" or having "suf
fered a misfortune" or even "tragic"
(since it will certainly die from this
affliction) than it would be to so
describe a human infant born blind.
This unnoticed equivocation on "mis
fortune" (technical use in Pl but
common use in P2) is what makes the
argument seem plausible.
Conclusion: Pl is false. One can
suffer the misfortune of death even
though one lacks the inteilectual
capacity for taking an interest in or
valuing life itself. Assuming no after
life awaits one--the traditional assump
tion in the case of animals--that is not
hard to understand: death is ordinar
ily a misfortune for an individual
(whether he knows it or not) because
it totally eliminates the possibility of
his further happiness. For a highly
rational, self-conscious being the mis
fortune of death may have additional
sources, e.g., the frustration of cat
egorical desires, but this annihilation
of the possibility of happiness is suf
ficient to render death a serious
enough, morally significant loss to be
a misfortune. That death is commonly
not considered a misfortune but a
blessing when this possibility has
already been eliminated by disease or
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accident adds credence to this inter
pretation. Consequently, even if ani
mals cannot attend to, understand the
importance of, and value life itself, it
does not follow that they cannot suf
fer the misfortune of death nor that it
would be nonsensical to extend the
right to life to them to protect them
from this misfortune.
One last criticism might be made at
this point: it might be objected that
for an individual to suffer the misfor
tune of death, death must be a mis
fortune for him and this is not
accountedfor by the above analysis.
Cigman writes:
If the worst that can be
said of the quick and painless
death of an animal is that it
removes a quantity of pleasu
rable
experience
from
the
world, this does not justify
call that death a misfortune for
the animal who dies. (54)
Phrases of the foriTl"not-X is a mis
fortune for B" are ambiguous. They
may be equivalent to "not-X is B's
misfortune" or to "B considers not-X
a misfortune." Even this latter option
is ambiguous, since it may be equiva
lent to "B judges not-X to be a mis
fortune" or to "B directly experiences
not-X to be a misfortune."
Surveying these alternatives, we
can see that the last is too strong for
an acceptable analysis of the misfor
tune of death. There are some forms
of death which we cannot directly
experience but which we want to be
protected against by the right to life
and, therefore, want to have counted
as misfortunes. For example, we can
not directly experience a sudden
death while in a deep sleep to be a
misfortune. 8 On the other hand, the
second alternative is too weak, since
we can judge to be misfortunes things
which do not affect ou r lives.
For
example, I would judge that the mem
bers of The People's Temple who suf
suf..
..
fered a mass death in Guyana three
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years ago suffered a misfortune, but
it certainly does not follow that I have
suffered the misfortune of death.
This leaves only. the "not-X is B's
misfortune" alternative as a suitable
interpretation of "death is a misfor
tune for B," and the above analysis
of the misfortune of death accounts
for that alternative. Death is a mis
fortune for an animal because it is its
possibility of future happiness, and
not merely some anonymous "quantity
of pleasu rable experience," which is
destroyed by its death. So, the claim
that to suffer the misfortune of death
death must be a misfortune for the
one who dies does not constitute an
objection to an animal's death being a
misfortune. 9
Common usage confirms this conclu
sion.
Recent a young woman was
wal king along a San Francisco street
on a stormy night.
As she walked
past an old building, a large piece of
the building's concrete parapet fell
from the sixth floor and struck her on
the head. She never knew what hit
her; she died instantly.
No one
would feel any hesitation in saying
this was a misfortune for the young
woman (not just for her family and
friends), even though she experienced
no fear of impending death nor any
sense of frustration of her plans for
the future.
The misfortune is that
here was a young woman "cut off in
the prime of life," a young woman
"with her whole life ahead of her," a
young woman who will never have the
chance to experience "the joys life
might have brought her."
These
common expressions do not refer to
the young woman's philosophy of life,
feelings at dying, or prospects for
the future. They refer to the happy
life she might have had but now never
will, and that is very sad. The same
can be said for a caracul lamb killed
less than a day out of its mother's
womb or a baby seal killed when only
a few days old or a veal calf slaugh
tered when only a few months old.
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Their early deaths are misfortunes for
them, for they, too, are cut off in
the prime of life, had their whole
lives ahead of them, and will never
know the joys life might have brought
them.
These cases, too, are very
sad, and if we can set aside our sen
timental bias in favor of ou r oWn spec
ies, we can see that we have the same
reasons for saying that a misfortune
has befallen these animals as we do
for saying that a misfortune has befal
len the young woman killed by the
falling parapet.
In closing I would like briefly to
discuss one other, unfortunate classic
to be found in Cigman's paper. She
asserts that advocates of animal rights
who draw an analogy between specie
sism and racism and sexism are claim
ing that
as women and blacks should
have equal· rights to those of
men and whites, animals should
have rights equal to those of
persons, because difference of
species does not constitute a
morally relevant difference. (47)
Apparently, many people have been
offended by the suggestion that there
is an analogy between species ism and
racism and sexism. 1 D They seem to
feel that it is absu rd to suggest that
animal welfare issues have the same
moral importance as human justice
issues and that the analogy demeans
efforts to secure human justice. Per
haps it is these feelings which lead
opponents of animal rights. so often to
misrepresent the animal rights move
ment as a call for equal rights.
The prejudice of speciesism does
not lie in denying animals the same
set of rights enjoyed by humans.
Animals have no interest in equal edu
cational or vocational opportunities, so
it would be nonsensical to suggest
that they should share human rights
to them.
Similarly, the prejudice of
speciesism does not lie in believing
that human life, with its greater

9
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range of capabilities for making the
world a morally better' place, has a
greater moral worth than animal life.
Peter Singer, for example, explicitly
acknowledges that if one is forced to
choose between preserving a human
life or an animal's life, it would (in
most cases) not be speciesist to prefer
the human life. 11 The prejudice of
speciesism lies in denying the inter~
ests of animals equal consideration
with the Ii ke interests of humans.

nonsense.
Hopefully,
criticism of
animal rights will
soon exit this
phase.
Steve F. Sapontzis�
Sapontzis
California State Univerity
Univerity�
Hayward
Hayward�
NOTES
NOTES�
1.�
1.

Just as it would be immoral to fol
fol
low Swift's modest proposal 12 routinely
(and avoidably) to sacrifice some peo
peo
ple's interest in life to fulfill others'
interest in food, so it should be
immoral routinely (and avoidably) to
sacrifice animals' interest in life for
that pu rpose.
Species differences do
not morally justify such routine, avoi
avoi
dable sacrifice of animal interests in
favor of human interests. This is the
sort of proposal animal rightists are
making. The analogy, then, between
speciesism and racism and sexism is
that humans regard animals as beings
whose interests may be routinely sac
sac
rificed for the fulfillment of their
(human) desires, much as whites and
men have regarded blacks and women
as beings whose interests do not merit
equal consideration with their own.
The animal rights movement pres~
ents at least as serious a challenge to
contemporary morality and lifestyle as
do the civil rights and women's move
move
ments, if seriousness be measured by
the number of individuals involved,
the fact that life or death is often at
issue, or the changes in morality and
lifestyle that the success of the move
move
ment would occasion. This movement
neither insults the moral significance
of the civil rights and women's rights
movements nor makes absu rd claims
that can be demonstrated to be non
non
sensical. William James said that reac
reac
tion to philosophical movements passes
through several phases, the first of
which is to portray the movement as

Philosophy.§: Public Affairs, lOll
(1981) .
2.� The following all employ similar
2.
McClos
lines of argument: H. J. McClos
key, "Rights," Philosophical Quar
Quar
~erly 15/59 (1965); Jan Narveson,
'Animal Rights," Canadian Journal
of Philosophy Vlll1 (1977); Bonnie
Steinbock, "Species ism and the
Idea
of
Equality,"
Philosophy
53/204 (1978); Leslie Francis and
Richard Norman, "Some Animals
are More Equal than Others, " Phi
Phi
losophy 53/206 (1978);
R. G.
Frey,
Interests
and
Rights
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1980);
and
Meredith
Williams,
"Rights,
Interests,
and
Moral
Equality, "
Envi ronmental
Ethics
2/2 (1980).
3. H. ---r:- A. Hart, "Bentham on
Legal Rights, in Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence (second series), edt
A. W. B. Simpson (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1973).
4.� This is the subtitle of Donald R.
4.
Griffin's The Question of Animal
Awareness--rN"ew
Awareness--rNew York: The Rocke
Rocke
feller University Press,
1976).
Even as severe a critic of Peter
Singer's position as Richard A.
dis
Watson wou Id seem ready to dis
pute P3; see his "Self-Conscious
"Self-Conscious
ness and the Rights of Nonhuman
Animals and Nature," Environmen
Environmen
tal Ethics 1/2 (1979).
5. Readers who may be concerned
5.�
that I am now talking about "valu
"valu
ing" while P1 talks about being
"capable of valuing," need not
worry.
After establishing the
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10�
meaning of "valuing" something, I
intend
to
discuss
the
moral
(in)significance both of valuing
life itself and of the capacity for
valuing life itself.
6.� Nomos~: Equality, pp. 62 ff.
6.
The relevant passages can also be
found· on pages 160-161 of Peter
Singer's "All Animals Are Equal,"
in Animal Rights and Human Obli
Obli
gatiOnS:- eds. Tom -Regan -and
Peter Singer (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1976).
7. Acknowledging the possibility of
7.�
extended rights, such as those of
a trustee
administering
an
orphan's estate, would
require
some qualification of this conclu
conclu
sion.
But such qualifications,
e.g., "one can have rights only in
those areas which affect one's feel
feel
ings or judgments about one's
well-being or the well-being of
those as whose agent one is act
act
ing," would not undermine the
present argument. Nor would add
add
ing the usual caveats concerning
capacity and normalcy.
8.� Suffering a loss is not essentially
8.
tied to suffering unpleasant feel
feel
ings at the loss.
"He suffered a
great loss without even knowing
it" is not a paradoxical statement;
it refers to such mundane things
as unknowingly putting a rare
penny in a gumball machine and
failing to answer a phone call
which would have earned one a
great prize.
Failing to recognize
this difference between suffering a
loss and other kinds of suffering
may have misled some philosophers
into believing that only those
capable of experiencing some feel
feel
ing of grief, frustration, etc., at
(the prospect of) death are capa
capa
ble of suffering the misfortune of
death.
Also, the possibility of
suffering a loss without suffering
unpleasant feelings at the loss
should not be confused w-fih the
possibility of suffering a loss
where what is lost will not affect
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one's feelings even in the condi
condi
tional sense that if one had had X
(or if X had occu rred), then one's
life would have been happier (or
more satisfying or less unpleasant,
etc.).
How this latter possibility
is to be understood and what, if
any, moral significance it may
have are controversies we need
not enter into here, for I am not
attempting to defend the possibil
possibil
ity of an animal right to life on
the basis of that latter possibility.
9. Epicurus contended that an indi
indi
vidual's death could not be a mis
mis
fortune for him because while he
is alive he cannot suffer it and
when he is dead he cannot suffer
anything.
The above analysis
indicates that it is the living who
suffer the misfortune of death.
This is
not self-contradictory,
because (although some may brood
about it beforehand) the living
suffer this misfortune only when
they die.
Harry Silverstein has
recently contended (in "The Evil
of Death," The Journal of Philoso
Philoso
~ LXXYII17(1980)) that such a
deprivation resolution" of "Epicu
"Epicu
rus'
dilemma"
will
not
work,
because it includes a life-death
comparison which presupposes that
death has a value for the dead
person, which is impossible.
Sil
Sil
verstein confuses death as the loss
of a possibility (further life) with
death as the actualization of an
alternative possibility (a world in
which the individual is no longer
alive).
It is the former which
(ordinarily) involves the misfor
misfor
tu ne of death., viz., the loss of
the� possibility offurther happi
the
happi
ness, and the subject of the loss
of life is the living person who
dies.
10.�
10.
For example, see Francis and
Norman, 92. cit., p. 527 (tithe
equation of animal welfare with
genuine liberation movements such
as black liberation, women 's libera~
tion, or gay liberation has the
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effect of trivializing those real lib
liberation movements") and Watson,
9£. cit., p. 119 ("Singer's claim
that the struggle against the tyr
tyranny of human over nonhuman
animals is a struggle as important
as any of the moral and social
issues that have been fought over
in recent years is insulting to past
and recent victims of moral and
social oppression ").
11.�
11.
Peter Singer, Animal Liberation
(New York: Avon~ook~T977),
pp. 20-22. As in other emergency
situations,
where one has
to
choose between saving the young
or the old, the infi rm or the
healthy, etc., what would ordinar
ordinarily not make a significant moral
difference can make such a differ
difference.
12.�
12.
Swift proposed that the Irish
problem, too many people and too
little money, be solved by selling
I rish infants for English roasts.
Jonathan Swift, "A Modest Propo
Proposal for Preventing the Children of
Poor Parents from Being a Bu rthen
to Their Parents or Country, and
for Making Them Beneficial to the
People" (1729); reprinted in Ani
Animal Rights and Human Obligations.
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